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THE COMMON LAW HISTORY OF PROBATION
An Illustration of the "Equitable" Growth of Criminal Law
Frank W. Grinnell"
The practical importance of continued
study of probation in different states,
as well as in the federal system under
the Director of the new "Administrative Office of the United States Courts,"
suggests that some useful purpose may
be served by the following condensation of a study published 2 twenty-four
years ago. It deals with forgotten but
very practical history, and, like an arrow shot into the air, it may land somewhere to stir the imagination of some
judges and prosecutors, in unexpected
ways, as to current and future development of the criminal "adjective" law
in accordance with the orthodox common law tradition. The approaching
formulation of rules of criminal procedure by the Supreme Court of the
United States under the recent act of
congress3 furnishes an additional reason for retelling the story to revive
professional recollection. It may help
to modify the contempt sometimes expressed for early legal history and
practices.
In December, 1917, in the case of
' 4
"Ex parte United States, Petitioner,
for a writ of mandamus to Judge Killits
of the Federal District for Northern
Ohio, the Supreme Court decided to
issue the writ directing Judge Kiflits to
revoke an order suspending execution
160 State St., Boston, Mass.

2Mass. Law Quart., No. 6 (August, 1917), pp.
591-639.

of a sentence in the case before the
Court and held that all probationary
powers which had been exercised by
Federal judges during the past fifty or
sixty years without specific directions
in acts of Congress were mistaken and
illegal. In view of the fact that the
Court knew that there were several
thousands of convicted persons who
were out on probation by the acts of
Federal judges in different parts of the
country, and had been living reputable
lives, the Court suggested that, so far
as any injustice to them was concerned,
"a complete remedy may be afforded
by the exertion of the pardoning power,"
and "that the exceptional conditions
...require that we exercise that reasonable- discretion with which we are
vested to temporarily suspend the issue
of the writ (of mandamus), so as to
afford ample time for executive clemency, or such other action as may be
required to meet the situation." Thereafter about 5,000 persons were pardoned by the president--one of the
largest wholesale acts of clemency in
our history.
While the case arose in Ohio where
the practice in the Federal Court had
been to impose sentence and then suspend its operation, yet the argument
in the opinion dealt with the practice in
3 See Mr. Dean's article in 24 Am. Jud. Soc.
Journal (Oct., 1940), 81-83.
4 242 U. S ....
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the First Circuit of "placing on file,"
or placing on probation after verdict
or plea of guilty, but before sentence.
During the argument of this case R. W.
Hale, Esq., of the Boston bar, and the
writer, were requested by one of the
federal judges of the First Circuit, to
prepare and file a brief, as amici curiae,
in support of this Massachusetts practice, as it had been followed in this
circuit for, at least, sixty years, and in
the state courts for a much longer time,
as part of the judicial function without
express statutory authority. It was in
the course of the preparation of that
brief that parts of this article were compiled.
The Practice in the First Circuit
Which was Held Illegal.
The description of the practice from
the brief referred to was as follows:
'In this Court cases often occur in
which the judge believes that neither an
immediate prison sentence nor an immediate fine-which often amounts to a
short prison sentence-is in the best interest of the United States. In these
cases a plea or verdict of guilty is taken
and recorded, but no entry is made accepting or adopting that plea or verdict
in any way, and the case is continued
without any judgment; that is to say,
without sentence. The case being continued, the defendant is admitted to bail.
In suitable cases he is required to furnish
sureties, but generally the bail are not
persons whose pecuniary responsibility
is important. They are chosen for their
fitness to have that custody of the offender which common-law bail always
have, and they are chosen as persons
who are likely to be able, in consequence
of such custody or supervision, to give
intelligent information about the offender. It is hoped that their influence
will cause some amelioration to his behavior.

"Until the actual sentence the Court
never makes any final decision as to
whether it will sentence at all; and if so,
as to whether the punishment shall be
fine or imprisonment, minimum or maximum ...
"The Assistant United States Attorneys for the District, and other persons
connected with prosecutions, have been
generous in giving their time in such
cases. Helpful reports are secured from
them. Voluntary service is also received
from the probation officers of the Superior Court of Suffolk County, Massachusetts, and from other people with
similar training. There have been cases
of unusually young defendants, and, in
these, persons connected with the Juvenile Court of the City of Boston have
also freely given important and voluntary service. In~every case which arose
before the present case began, the proceedings have had the assent of the
United States Attorney.
"This has been the practice of the
United States District Judge and his
predecessors in office for at least sixty
years; and, until the present discussion,
no question has ever been raised as to its
legality. In the case of United States v.
Margaret Mulhall, on June 2, 1914, the
United States Attorney for the District
stated in open court that the Attorney
General of the United States requested
the exercise of the power to suspend
judgment and sentence." .. .
The Massachusetts Story and Its
Juristic Significance
"Massachusetts has been called the
'home of probation.' . . . The practice
antedates the statutes .... The statutes

have indeed been chiefly the record of
an accomplished idea."-Mass. Probation Manual.
The particular reason for recording
the Massachusetts story, aside from
purely historical interest, is to avoid
any inference from the opinion in the
Killits case that the Supreme Court of
the United States intended to draw a
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line between the recognition of the
judicial development of principles in
their application to administrative
problems in civil causes and similar
development of principles in their
application to criminal administration.
It is common knowledge that equity
jurisdiction developed, not by legislation, but through the application of
principles by courts in providing a
more flexible system of remedies as life
became more complex, in order to
alleviate the strictness of the common
law rules which, unless so alleviated,
would have resulted in much injustice.
It is also common knowledge that not
only were these equitable principles
applied in the chancery courts, but that
many of them found their way into the
structure of the common law system
through the gradual recognition by
common law courts of some of these
principles which found expression
through the development of remedies,
as most law ultimately finds expression, in the varied growth of the action
of assumpsit, in the .introduction of
equitable defenses, and otherwise.
Now let us turn to the history of
criminal administration and see what
happened. Prior to the adoption of the
American Constitutions there were
various methods by which in some
cases the strict legal punishment of
crime was alleviated, at times when
theft was punished by death-the
bloody period of criminal administration which stirred the soul of Samuel
Romilly.
"Benefit of Clergy"
These methods were, first, in some
of the capital crimes, the exemp-

tion from punishment, which was described as "benefit of clergy." This
exemption, which originated in the
claims of ecclesiastics to be exempt
from criminal process before the secular courts, was subsequently extended
by various English statutes to include
also peers, who were presumed to be
able to read, and to commoners who
could establish themselves as "clerks"
by proving that they could read. (See
4 Blackstone, Chap. 28.)
It did not operate even-handedly for
all classes of men, as indicated by the
foregoing statement, but it made the
world somewhat less bloody for the
following reasons, as stated by Bishop
in the eighth edition of his "Criminal
Law," Sect. 936, page 565:
"Since felonies comprehend a large
part of the crimes, the uniform infliction
of death would be too bloody. To which
evil the wisdom of our forefathers found
a remedy in the plea of clergy or benefit
of clergy. . . . A word explanatory of
this . . . by way of memento of departed piety, humanity and genius will
not be inappropriate."
"Sect. 938. In this country (America),
the benefit of clergy is ordinarily acknowledged as belonging to our common
law."1
And so also in Foster's "Crown Law"
(second edition, 1791) appears the
following passage:
"But light and sound sense have at
length, though by very slow degrees,
made their way to us; we now consider
the benefit of clergy, or rather the benefit
of the statute, as a relaxation of the rigour of the law, a condescension to the
infirmities of the human frame; and
therefore in the case of all clergyable
felonies we now measure the degree of.
punishment by the real enormity of the
offense; not as the ignorance and superstition of former times suggested by a
senseless dream of sacred persons or
sacred functions."

FRANK W. GRINNELL

For an account of the history of
"benefit of clergy" from a different
angle, see Bentham, "Principles of the
Penal Law," Part II, Book V, Chap.
IV, Bentham's works, Bowrings ed.,
Vol. I, 505.
As an instance of the practical discretion in regard to the mitigation of
punishment exercised by the courts in
the seventeenth century and the
bishop's clerks who performed the
function of the modem probation
officer in advising the Court as to the
right of prisoners to claim the benefit
of clergy, the following passage, printed
as "Note L," at page 103 in the third
edition, of Romilly's speech of 1810.
hereinafter referred to, is illuminating:
"Before the reign of Queen Anne,
when the benefit of clergy was allowed
to such only as could read, and when
consequently the ignorant were doomed
to die for offences for which a slight
punishment only was inflicted on those
who had received some educaton, and
who were therefore less excusable, the
gross absurdity and injustice of the law
was in a considerable degree corrected
by the falsehood of the clerk who was to
report of the convict's learning, and by
the connivance of the court. But this
connivance was not universal, the judge
exercised his discretion whether to connive or not. In common cases he received the false certficate without inquiry, but where he thought that he discerned circumstances of aggravation, he
scrutinized strictly into the prisoner's
ability to read. Such at least was the
practice of Lord Chief Justice Kelyng, as
he himself informs us, 'As the Lent
Assizes at Winchester, 18 Car. 2, the
clerk,' he says, 'appointed by the bishop
to give clergy to the prisoners, being to
give it to an old thief; I directed him to
deal clearly with me, and not to say

legit in case he could not read; and
thereupon he delivered the book to him,
and I perceived the prisoner never
looked upon the book at all, and yet the

Bishop's clerk, upon the demand of legit
or non legit, answered legit; and thereupon I wished him to consider, and told
him I doubted he was mistaken, and bid
the clerk of the assizes ask him again,
legit or non legit, and he answered again
somewhat angrily, legit: then I bid the
clerk of the assizes not to record it: and
I told the parson he was not the judge
whether he read or no, but a ministerial
officer to make a true report to the court.
And so I caused the prisoner to be
brought near and delivered him the
book, and then the prisoner confessed
he could not read; whereupon I told the
parson he had reproached his function,
and unpreached more that day than he
could preach up again in many days;
and because it was his personal offence
and misdemeanor, I fined him five
'marks' (Kel. Rep. 51). Instances of this
kind afforded no just cause of complaint.
The convict it is true suffered the greater
punishment for his offence because his
parents had neglected his education, but
such was the law, and though the judge
in his discretion connived at a departure
from it in nineteen cases out of twenty,
he could hardly be said to deserve censure when in the twentieth he only took
care that the law should not be evaded."
(Romilly's "Observations on the Criminal Law of England," etc., third edition,
pp. 103, 104.)
The British soldiers who were convicted after the Boston Massacre
escaped the penalty by claiming the
benefit of clergy.
This appears on page 120 of the
pamphlet report of "The Trial of the
British Soldiers of the 29th Regiment
of Foot For the Murder of Crispus
Attucks et al on Monday evening,
March 5, 1770, printed and published
by Belcher and Armstrong, No. 70
State St. 1807," as follows:
(Six found not guilty)
"Matthew Kilroy and Hugh Montgomery, not guilty of murder but guilty
of manslaughter. . . . Kilroy and Montgomery prayed the Benefit of Clergy
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which was allowed them, and thereupon
they were each of them burnt in the
hand in open court, and discharged."
Emory Washburn, writing in 1840,
in his "Judicial History of Massachusetts," says (at p. 194):
"In criminal matters . . . the common law was in a great measure retained, even to the benefit of clergy.
The last instance of this, that I have
discovered, was the case of James Bell
in March, 1773. He was convicted of
manslaughter in the Superior Court in
Boston, where he pleaded the benefit of
clergy and was accordingly burned in
the hand and discharged."
"Many other instances might be cited
where prisoners were admitted to the
benefit of clergy. Thus in 1770, George
White and Patrick Freeman having been
convicted of burglary were burnt in the
hand, having claimed the benefit of
clergy." 5
After the adoption.bf the constitution, however, the uneven application
of the law of benefit of clergy resulted
in its abolition in Massachusetts by the
following statute:
1784-CHAPTER 56
(January Session, Ch. 23)

Chap. 56. AN ACT

FOR TAKING AWAY
THE BENEFIT OF CLERGY IN ALL CASES
WHATSOEVER, AND DIRECTING ADEQUATE
PUNISHMENT FOR THE CRIMES WHERE THE
SAME USED TO BE ALLOWED.

more adequate remedy may be provided:
Be it therefore enacted by the Senate
and House of Representatives, in General Court assembled, and by the
authority of the same, That from and
after the publication of this law, the
plea of benefit of clergy shall not be
used or allowed in any cause whatsoever,
unless in the prosecution for crimes
committed before the passing of. this
act, for which the said plea of benefit of
clergy would have then been allowed.
And be it further enacted by the
authority aforesaid, That if any person
shall be convicted of any crime wherein
by law the plea of benefit of clergy was
heretofore allowed, and for which, without such benefit of clergy, he must have
been adjudged to suffer the pains of
death, such person shall be set upon the
gallows for the space of one hour, with
a rope about his neck, and the other end
cast over the gallows, pay a fine, not
exceeding five hundred pounds, be
whipped, not exceeding thirty-nine
stripes, and be bound to the good behaviour, or suffer one or more of the
above punishments, according to the
aggravation of the offence; and so often
as he shall be convicted of the same
crime, shall suffer the punishments
above mentioned, or any one or more
of them, unless some other punishment
shall be, or may have been by the laws
of this Commonwealth assigned for such
crime, in which case the offender shall
suffer as by such law is or shall be
directed.
March 11, 1785.
See Revised Statutes of 1836, c. 133,

Preamble. Whereas, the plea of benefit
§15.
of clergy, though it was originally
founded in superstition and injustice,
Security for "Good Behavior"
yet by long usage and the humanity
of criminal law, is so interwoven with
A second method of alleviating strict
it as to become very essential in its
punishment was in lesser crimes by
present system: but forasmuch as the
operation of it consists only in the the process of holding to security for
mitigationof the punishment for those good behavior or "good abearance."
crimes where it is allowed, which in This jurisdiction was described in early
most cases operates very inadequately
and disproportionately,and for which American cases as follows:
5 An interesting passage in Dane's Abridgment,
chapter 193, article 40, quotes from the Act of
Congress of April 30, 1790, as follows: "That the

Benefit of Clergy shall not be used or allowed
upon conviction of any crime, for which, by any
statute of the United States, punishment is, or
shall be, declared to be death."
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In Com. v. Duane, 1 Binney, 98, note,
Tilghman, C. J., said:
"Surety for good behavior may be
considered in two points of view. It is
either required after conviction of some
indictable offense, in which case it forms
part of the judgment of the Court, and
is founded on a power incident to courts
of record by the common law, or it is
demanded by judges or justices of the
peace out of court, before the trial ...
in pursuance of authority derived from
a Statute made in the 34th year of
Edward 3."

And since I have known it allowed as
a good Cause by the Judges of Assise."' 8
The jurisdiction to grant the good
behavior continued, as it was not confined to any class of persons and it is
still part of the jurisdiction of Massachusetts courts. (Cf. also U. S., R. S.,
§727 and New Fed. Code, §270.)
Technical Defenses

and it was held that that was the early
law of Tennessee.
It was a proceeding which was well
known throughout the New England
States. For instance, Burns, Justice,
in the Dover, N. H., abridgment by
Eliphalet Ladd, of 1792 (pp. 400, 412),
contains a reference to the following
passage in Dalton's "Country Justice,"
edition of 1746, page 288, where Dalton
says:
"I lately granted the good behavior
against one for that he had bought Ratsbane and mingled the same with Corn
and then wilfully and maliciously did
cast the same among his Neighbors
Fowls, whereby most of them died ....

In addition to the other methods of
mitigating the extreme severity of the
earlier criminal penalties, we should
not forget the practice of subjecting
the indictment to the keenest technical
scrutiny and granting motions to quash
after verdict, with the result of freeing
the prisoner. This practice of extreme
strictness in dealing with criminal indictments has been the cause of much
ridicule in modern times, but its origin
was humane and was one of the methods by which the courts "administered"
practical justice at a time when the
inertia of the community was such that
it still allowed excessive penalties to
remain upon the statute books. The
necessity and the consequent practice
of such strict requirements in criminal
pleading have disappeared as the more
humane attitude toward criminals has
developed in Massachusetts. Accordingly, this early strictness of criminal
pleading may fairly be added to the
"benefit of clergy," to "good behavior,"
and to suspension of sentence, combined with a judicial recommendation
of pardon as a further evidence of the
central idea or principle which modern
analysis finds to be part of the essential

IThe same passage occurs in the folio edition
of Dalton of 1691. Cf. Chitty Crim. Law, 2d ed.,
Vol. I, chap. 15. 16, Rex v. Draper, and Rex v.

Hart, 30 How. State trials, pp. 1129 and 1344, and
Reg. v. Dunn, 10 Ad. & El. 1026, at 1041; Queen
v. Richardson, 8 Dow. Pr. 511.

The report of this case in "Hall's
American Law Journal and Miscellaneous Repertory," 168, must have
given it wide currency. Hall's was the
first American law journal, and this the
second number.
In Estes v. State, 2 Humphreys
(Tenn.), 496, 498, it is said:
"Binding to the .good behavior was a
discretionary judgment, at the common
law, after a conviction for a gross misdemeanor, before the passage of the
statute of 34 Edward 3,"
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meaning of the phrase "to administer
justice."
Compassionate Verdicts
The other indirect methods of mitigating the severity of penalties are
shown in the following passage from
the great speech of Romilly in the
House of Commons on February 9,
1810, on a motion for leave to bring in
bills to repeal the Acts of 10 and 11
William III, 12 Ann and 24 George H,
which made the crimes of privately
stealing in a shop goods to the value of
five shillings and of stealing in a dwelling house property of the value of forty
shillings, capital felonies.
"In how many instances such crimes
have been committed, and the persons
robbed have not proceeded so far
against the offenders as even to have
them committed to prison; how many
of the 1,872 thus committed were discharged, because those who had suffered by their crimes would not appear
to give evidence upon their trial: in
how many cases the witnesses who did
appear withheld the evidence that they
could have given; and how numerous
were the instances in which juries
found a compassionate verdict, in direct
contradiction to the plain facts clearly
established before them, we do not
know; but that these evils must all
have existed to a considerable degree,
no man can doubt." (Romilly's "Observations on the Criminal Law of
England," etc., pp. 10, 11.)
Judge Thacher
The next recorded step in the development of the policy of fitting the punish-

ment to the crime in the light of the
circumstances appears about 1830, in the
beginning of the recorded history of the
probation system in Massachusetts. That
probation system appears to be simply
a modern scientific application of the
underlying principle in the older and
cruder methods already referred to. It
was all a part of the gradual and more
humane study of criminal administration, to which the Marquis of Beccaria
had given so strong an impetus by his
little book published in the middle of
the eighteenth century. It is quite
probable that some form of probation
practice was followed when possible in
cases where the circumstances warranted it, before the recorded story
begins.
The beginning of the recorded story
in Massachusetts appears to be the case
of Commonwealth v. Chase, Thacher's
Criminal Cases, page 267, which arose
in the old Municipal Court of Boston
in which Judge Peter Oxenbridge
Thacher sat for twenty years from 1823
to 1843. As stated in the preface to the
volume of his criminal cases published
after his death, he "was distinguished
for his earnest study and thorough
knowledge of the criminal law and its
practical application."
This case is recorded in Volume XIX
of the Records of the old Municipal
Court of Boston, at page 199. As this
opinion by Judge Thacher is the
earliest recorded judicial discussion of
the subject of probation in its modern
sense known to the writer, and as the
volume of the "Law Reporter" in which
it was first published, and the subsequent publication of "Thacher's Crim-
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PETER OXENBRIDGE THAcHER

inal Cases" are not always within
convenient reach, the entire opinion is
here reprinted:
MAY TERM, 1831
COMMONWEALTH V. JERUSHA CHASE

The defendant was indicted at the
January term of the court, 1830, for
stealing from a dwelling house, and upon
her arraignment, pleaded guilty. The
prosecuting officer did not move for
sentence, and the indictment was laid on
file, the defendant entering into recognizance with sureties to appear before
the court when sent for. At the present
term of the court, the defendant was indicted for a larceny, and upon her trial,
was acquitted. The county attorney then
moved for sentence upon the first mentioned indictment.
S. D. Parker, for the defendant, contended, 1. That the proceedings in the
court at the January term were full and
complete; and that they amounted to a
sentence. 2. That the matter having
been acted upon and finished, could not
be brought forward per saltum, but
should have been continued from term
to term.
THAcHER, J. The indictment against
Jerusha Chase was found at the January

term of this court, 1830. She pleaded
guilty to the same, and sentence would
have been pronounced at that time, but
upon the application of her friends, and
with the consent of the attorney of the
commonwealth, she was permitted, upon
her recognizance for her appearance in
this court whenever she should be
called for, to go at large. It has sometimes been practised in this court, in
cases of peculiar interest, and in the
hope that the party would avoid the
commssion of any offense afterwards,
to discharge him on a recognizance of
this description. The effect is, that no
sentence will ever be pronounced against
him, if he shall behave himself well
afterwards, and avoid any further violation of the law. But I cannot doubt the
court may, on motion, have the party
brought in and sentenced at any subsequent period. For what was the duty
of the court to do at any one time, cannot cease to be its duty by delay. The
judgment is postponed only, and it is in
the discretion of the attorney for the
commonwealth, to move at any time
afterwards for the appearance of the
party, according to the condition of the
recognizance.
In the case of Jerusha Chase, the defendant, the question is not on the
validity of the recognizance; but Whether
the former proceedings have discharged
her, §o that no further judgment can be
produced on the record. What are the
rights of a party called into court under
such circumstances? He may admit the
conviction, and plead a pardon for the
offense; or, he may deny that he is the
same person who is named in the indictment; in which case, the government
must prove his identity, like any other
material fact, by verdict of the jury. Or,
he may move in arrest of judgment for
the insufficiency of the record. But this
woman, upon being brought into court,
by another name, on being asked why
she should not be sentenced on this
indictment, admitted her identity. It
appears, therefore, by the record, that
public justice has not been satisfied; and
that no punishment has been inflicted
for her violation of the law, in the matter
whereof she stands convicted.
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But it is asked by her counsel, where
an indictment has been suffered to sleep
upon the files of the court for several
terms, and no notice has been taken of
it on the record or docket to keep it
alive, whether it is competent to call it
up at a future period, and to proceed
upon it as on a living process? But I do
not understand that a prosecution like
this can ever be said to be dead in law.
If it should be said, however, to be hard
measure to pronounce judgment after
it has been suspended for years, I
answer, that the party might at any time
have appeared in court, and -demanded
the judgment of law. It has been delayed from tenderness and humanity,
and not because it had ceased to be the
right of the government to claim the
judgment. By mutual consent, therefore,
the judgment has been delayed till .this
time, and this consent takes away all
error in the proceedings. 7 Sir Walter
Raleigh was executed on a sentence
which had been passed upon him fifteen
years before. But he did not claim to be
relieved from his fate on the ground of
the lapse of time between his judgment
and the final demand of the warrant of
execution, but on the ground of an implied pardon, arising from a commission
which had been issued to him by the
king, to command an expedition to a
foreign country, and in which was contained an authority over the lives of
others. 'It was argued, that such a commission. could not have issued to one
dead in law, and that the grant of such
a commission must have operated to
restore the party to the privileges of a
free subject. Undoubtedly Sir Walter
had hard measure dealt out to him by
his vain and weak sovereign.
By the record in this case, the defendant stands convicted of a crime, and
no sufficient reason is shown why the
sentence should not follow the conviction. It is as much the duty" of the court
to render judgment against a person
convicted of a crime, and within its
power, as to secure to such person a
fair trial. It would be against reason
and justice to do otherwise.
- 3 Co. 40, Dormer's Case.

The defendant was sentenced to five
days' solitary confinement and six
months in the house of correction.
The importance of this case is increased by a footnote on page 270
which records that a petition for certiorari was brought to reverse Judge
Thacher's decision; that upon a hearing
of this appeal Chief Justice Lemuel
$haw delivered an opinion sustaining
Judge Thacher, in which the other
judges of the Court were understood
to concur. These other judges were
Samuel Putnam, Samuel S. Wilde, and
Marcus Morton.
A diligent search for any record of
this opinion was unsuccessful, for
curiously enough, although the docket
of the case with the entry "petition dismissed" is in the files of the clerk of
the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk
County, all the papers in the case are
missing.
The petition for certiorari is noted
in the docket of the Supreme Judicial
Court for Suffolk County at the November term, 1831, where it appears,
on page 101, that S. D. Parker was for
the petitioner, and the Solicitor General for the Commonwealth. The entry
"Petn dismissed" is in handwriting
resembling that of Chief Justice Shaw.
The original indictment against
Jerusha Chase was found at the January term, 1830, and is endorsed:
"Feb. 8. Defendant retracts her plea
and pleads guilty and recognized in the
sum of two hundred dollars with Benjamin Salmon, trader, and Daniel Chase,
Cordwainer of Marblehead, to come
when sent for and in the meantime to
keep the peace," etc.
The case was also reported in 1839
in I. Law Reporter, 163 (Peleg W.
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Chandler, editor), with a note that
"the principles of the above decision
have often been recognized in Boston."

sentence on a boy for attempt to kill
by poisoning, Thacher, J., said:
"The object of all punishment, by a
human tiibunal, is twofold-to act upon
the offender and to bring him, if possible, to a better mind; and to deter others
by his sufferings from committing a

like offence ...
"I wish that I could impute it to accident, to want of discretion, to anything
rather than to malice; but not only the
verdict of the jury; but the circumstances of the case, convince me that the
defendant perpetrated this deed with
such deliberate malice that he is a suitable object of punishment.
"I have striven to find such circumstances of mitigationas would authorize
me to suspend the sentence, and to consent to send the defendant to the House
of Reformation for Juvenile Offenders.

But that house was not prepared for
such an offender as this."
"If he should be sent to that place it
would not, I fear, be regarded by the
community, and especially by the young,

JOHN AUGUSTUS
This note was undoubtedly written
by Chandler, as this was the first number of the "Law Reporter" and he was
its first editor, and his statement is
reliable, for there were few members
of the bar of his day who knew better
what they were talking about than
Peleg W. Chandler.
From the report of Com. v. Miller
Snell, reported in "Columbian Centinel," published in Boston, January
14, 1832, it appears that, when passing
8 The House of Refuge instituted by the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents
in the City of New York in 1824 was "the first
of the kind in the United States by which the
experiment of juvenile reformation was fairly
attempted." The documents relating to its early

history were published together in a volume for
general information in 183Z a copy of which may

as a punishment. To send him home to
his friends, without punishment, would
be a great reflection on the justice of the
law."

The FirstProbationOfficer
Today we know that the backbone
of the probation system is a good probation officer and it is peculiarly fitting
that the centennial anniversary of the
appearance of the first of such men, as
a public-spirited volunteer, in 1841,
should be celebrated this year in connection with the annual conference of
the National Probation Association in
Boston on May 28-31. Judge Thacher's
practice was in a jury court with jurisdiction of all criminal cases not capital.
be found in the Boston Athenaeum. Following
this experiment, the House of Reformation for
Juvenile Offenders was established (St. 1825-26,
ch. 182). This was the institution referred to in
the quotation from Judge Thacher, quoted above,
from the "Columbian Centinel." An account of
this institution was published in pamphlet form
in 1833. For earlier treatment of juveniles see
St. 1787, c. 54; 1793, c. 59.
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The Boston Police Court was a separate
tribunal. Obviously following up the
precedents established by Judge Thacher,
"John Augustus, humble New England
shoemaker, a spectator in the Boston
Police Court in 1841, asked the judge
to let him stand sponsor for a man whose
conduct ordinarily would have consigned
him to the House of Correction. According to authentic records, this little
known social pioneer carried out continuously for the remaining eighteen
years of his life a system of probation
supervision for more than two thousand
offenders, young and old. His pioneer
work embodied all the essentials of
modern probation service."
The Sources of Judge Thacher's
Practice
It is idle to imagine that Judge
Thacher's practice was the accidental
result of the benevolent impulses of a
single judge and had no roots in the
history of the law. Peter Oxenbridge
Thacher was one of the thoughtful men
of the profession in his day. He began
his twenty years of service on the criminal bench in the old Municipal Court
of Boston, in 1820, in the midst of the
"Era of Good Feeling," when James
Monroe was President of the UnitedStates. The nation was at peace, the
general framework of its government
had been tested by time and struggle,
and men were able to read and think
more widely and to consider the details
of government. If any one will
spend half an hour with the index to
the first twenty-five volumes 6f the
"North American Review" and look up
the passages under the headings of
"Crime," "Punishment," "Romilly,"
"Bentham," etc., he will see that the
thoughtful and far-sighted men of that

day had followed the work of Beccaria,
Bentham, and Romilly, and that problems of criminal administration were
agitating men's minds on both sides of
the Atlantic.
In this, as in many other matters
relating to modem government, Montesquieu was in the background. He
devotes a few short chapters in his
"Spirit of Laws" to the subject of punishment. A copy of the sixth Edinburgh
edition of an English translation published in 1772, was presented to the
Boston Athenmum in January, 1810,
and it may be safely assumed that this
or some other edition was read by
Thacher and all other careful students
of government of that day in this
neighborhood.
The following quotation is a sample
of the views expressed by Montesquieu:
"Men must not be led by excess of
violence; we ought to make a prudent use
of the means which nature has given u's
to conduct them. If we enquire into the
cause of all human corruptions, we shall
find that they proceed from the impunity of crimes, and not from the moderation of punishments.
"Let us follow nature, who has given
shame to man for his scourge, and let
the heaviest part of the punishment be
the infamy attending it." (Vol. 1, book
6, chap. 12.)
In reading and reflecting upon the
work of these men, as in reflecting on
the work of other men who were connected with the beginnings of the
American nation, it is important to
remember that they were inspired by
practical and dramatic conditions of
cruelty and injustice, of which the
ordinary American citizens of today,
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up to the beginning of the present
European war, had no conception.*
The present war is bringing men
back to the realization that we are
living in the same old world, and that
the barbarous tendencies of human
nature are not so securely held back
by the restraints of civilized character
as many people suppose. This fact
makes the sane and scientific humane
study of criminal administration and
the penal system of primary importance
in a democracy as a matter of legal and
equitable principle, in order that the
encouragement of the best instincts of
prisoners toward the restraints of character, as well as the importance of a
firm and fair administration of punishment adapted to the circumstances,
may receive due, but not excessive consideration. It is necessary to face the
practical problem described by Montesquieu when he said:
"There are two sorts of corruption:
one, when the people do not observe the
laws: the other, when they are corrupted
by the laws, an incurable evil, because
it is in the very remedy itself." (Vol. 1,
book 6, chap. 12.)
Beccaria, building, as he said in his
introduction, on a foundation laid by
Montesquieu, who "has but slightly
touched on this subject," laid a basis
for future development in his "Essay
on Crimes and Punishments."
Beccaria's book was translated into
French by Molleret, and widely distributed in France. It was later translated into English and three editions
of it had been printed before 1775,
when the fourth edition appeared. John
* Cf. Journal of Criminal Law and Crininology for Sept.-Oct._ pp. 259-269 and Nov.Dec. 1940, pp. 410-416.

Adams quoted from it in his argument
to the jury in defence of the British
soldiers who were tried for murder
after the Boston Massacre.
In Romilly's diary, under the date
of August 20, 1808, appears the following passage relative to Bentham's
treatise on punishments:
"Since the work of Beccaria, nothing
has appeared on the subject of the
Criminal Law which has made any impression on the public. This work will,
I think, probably make a very deep
impression." ("Life of Romilly," Vol. 2,
p. 94.)
A casual reading of Romilly's speech
in 1810, in favor of the repeal of statutes making minor thefts capital
offences, will give a more vivid idea of
the facts of practice during the previous
century than such text-books as Blackstone and others, and it there appears
that judges had and exercised the discretion to mitigate the death penalty
in many of these-cases. It was against
the severity of the penalties and the
irregularity in regard to the mitigation
of them that Romilly fought in favor
of saner principles. The reformatory
idea had not taken definite shape in
1810, even for juvenile offenders, although it had been suggested by Sir
John Fielding.* But that the minds of
men were approaching the theory of
probation as a judicial function is
shown by passages scattered through
Bentham's work on "Punishments" and
by passages in a letter written to Romilly by Dr. Parr in 1811, and printed in
a footnote in Romilly's Life, Vol. 2, pp.
180, 182. Romilly's own mind was ap* See A. B. A. Journal for Sept. 1940, pp.
725-730.
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proaching it, as shown by the entry in
his diary for Sunday, May 21, 1811:
"Penal legislation hitherto has resembled what the science of physics must
have been when physicians did not know
the properties and effects of the medicines they administered." ("Life of
Romilly," Vol. 2, p. 198.)
Judge Thacher was familiar with
these ideas and when he went on the
bench he began to apply them. That
appears to be the beginning of probation in Massachusetts.
In 1874, forty-four years after Judge
Thacher's opinion in the Chase case,
the same question whether the laying
of a case on file was the final disposition of it, or whether the defendant
could be summoned into court subsequently for the imposition of sentence
arose again in Coin: v. Dowdican's
Bail, 115 Mass. 133. Hon. Charles R.
Train, a man of large experience, was
then Attorney General, and appeared
for the commonwealth in asking for
sentence, and his brief contained the
following statement:
"It has been a not uncommon practice
in the Criminal Courts in this Commonwealth, after verdict, in minor offences,
or where there were extenuating circumstances, or where questions of law
upon similar questions were pending
before this or some other court, to delay
passing sentence, and order the case to
be laid on file. It has always been considered that the effect of such an order
was simply to suspend passing of sentence, leaving it in the power of the court
at any time, when the reasons which
induced the delay no longer existed, to
take the case from the files and have it
proceed to judgment. The defendant in
all cases where sentence was thus delayed on account of extenuating circumstances was put on his good behavior
and under bonds, as it were, to live
honestly."

The unanimous opinion of the court
was delivered by Chief Justice Gray
on this point as follows:
"It has long been a common practice
in this Commonwealth, after verdict of
guilty in a criminal case, when the Court
is satisfied that . . . public justice does
not require an immediate sentence, to
order, with the consent of the defendant
and of the attorney for the Commonwealth, and upon such terms as the
Court in its discretion may impose, that
the indictment be laid on file; and this
practice has been recognized by statute
(Sts. 1865, c. 223; 1869, c. 415, §60). Such
an order is not equivalent to a final
judgment or to a nolle prosequi or discontinuance, by which the case is put
out of court; but is a mere suspending
of active proceedings in the case . . .
and leaves it within the power of the
Court at any time, upon the motion of
either party, to bring the case forward
and pass any lawful order or judgment
therein. Neither the order laying the
indictment on file, .nor the payment of
costs, therefore, in any of the four cases,
entitled the defendant to be finally
discharged."
The two statutes* referred to by
Chief Justice Gray do not appear to
have been considered as creating the
power as to cases in general, but simply regulated the exercise of general
power in specific cases.
The practice of placing defendants
on probation, instead of sentencing
them, continued to be followed in
the various courts administering the
criminal law, so far as it was practicable in the absence of any regular force of probation officers or
available funds to meet the expenses
of such a system. This practice was
followed in the state courts down to
the time when the statutory system
was established in the Municipal Courts.
It was thus through judicial experi-
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ment, which was evidently believed to
be within the common law powers of
Massachusetts judges, that the principle of probation was applied experimentally in practice until, as a result
of gradually forming public opinion, the
practice became so generally approved
that the legislature took it up and provided for its development on a broader
scale than was otherwise possible and
from Massachusetts the system spread
all over the country.

was chapter 356 of 1891, which carried
the service to all the lower courts and
changed the appointment from a
municipal appointment to a judicial
appointment, so that the probation
officer was in every way an officer of
the Court. In 1898, by chapter 511, the
provisions of the act of 1891 were
extended from the lower court by giving the Superior Court the power to
appoint officers, although not compelling them to do so.

The Beginning of the Statutory
System

The important fact to bear in mind
in regard to the acts of 1878 and- other
acts relating to the lower courts and
the act of 1898 relative to the Superior
Court is that the obvious purpose of
these acts was not the creation of a
new judicial power, but the provision
for the appointment and payment of
special officers to assist the court .in
the exercise of a well-established and
well-recognized and approved existing
usage, the nature of which was such
that it could not be exercised to its full
extent and with best results by the
court without special assistance and
appropriation of funds to aid the court
by the investigation of facts.

In 1878 the Massachusetts legislature
passed an act (chapter 198 of that
year) "relating to placing on probation
persons accused or convicted of crimes
or misdemeanors in the County of
Suffolk." This act provided that the
Mayor of Boston should annually appoint a probation officer as part of the
police force, and is reputed to be the
first act by any legislative body using
the word "probation" in the sense of
placing persons convicted of crime in
the care of an official before being sent
to an institution. It is the pioneer
probation act in the modem sense,
It should be noticed also that these
although, as already pointed out, there
statutes were adjusted to the prior
was also the earlier statute recomjudicial usage of placing on probation
mended by the commissioners on the
before sentence.
Revised Statutes of 1835, which did not
The change in the practice, which is
provide a special officer to supervise
now general under statutory systems
the prisoner. The next statute was
in the country, began in Massachusetts
chapter 129 of 1880, which extended the
by chapter 449 of 1900, which provided
right to appoint probation officers to
that the lower courts might first impose
all the cities and towns in the state. sentence
and then "direct that the
Under this act some cities provided execution of the
sentence be suspended
themselves with such officers, but the for such time and on such
terms and
number was not large. The next statute conditions as it shall fix and may place
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such person on probation in the custody
of the probation officer of said court
during such suspension." This power
of suspending the execution of a sentence, however, has never been extended to the Superior Court, which
acts only before sentence in probation
cases.
It is true that the Supreme Court of
the United States in the Killits case
disposes of the long established practice
in Massachusetts, as evidence of the
common law, by the statement that the
opinion in the case of Dowdican's Bail
"treated the power as being brought
by the state legislation, which was referred to within the domain of reasonable discretion, since by the effect of
that legislation the right to exert such
power, if not directly authorized, was
at least, by essential implication sanctioned by the state law." It is also true
that the power which was recognized
as general in the statutes, referred to
in the opinion in the case of Dowdican's
Bail, was expressly recognized in the
earlier statute already referred to, Section 9 of Chapter 143 of the Revised
Statutes of 1836. But the fact remains
that the probation practice of the courts
does not appear to have been limited
to the offences with which this Section
9 of 1836 was concerned, and it is clear
that the power was considered by
Judge Thacher, an experienced criminal judge, as an inherent power in the
Court which he ought to exercise in
the interests of justice when the circumstances warranted it, long before
the Revised Statutes of 1836 were
adopted, and that his view of the practice and function of the Court in this

respect was approved by Chief Justice
Shaw and Judges Putnam, Wilde and
Marcus Morton (the first), one of the
strongest common law courts that ever
sat in Massachusetts. Unfortunately
there is no record of the grounds of the
opinion, but the fact that they did not
disturb Judge Thacher's practice is
clear, and it also seems clear from
papers in the possession of the writer
that Mr. Justice Story, who certainly
knew something about common law
principles, received, on its publication
in 1839, and read the first number of
the "Law Reporter," containing the report of the Chase case, which had been
decided eight years previous. If the
practice thus reported and confirmed
had appeared extraordinary or illegal
to the bar at that time it seems inconceivable that there should not have
been some discussion of the subject, for
it was a time when lawyers were beginning to write freely, and the "North
American Review," the "American Jurist," and the "Law Reporter" provided
ample opportunity for such discussion.
Other Common Law Examples
It is a common law principle that the
judicial function of the Court is not exhausted until the entry of judgment,
which, in a criminal case, is the imposition of the sentence. In Burgess v.
Boetefeur, 7 Man. & Gr. 481 (1844), the
plaintiff had informed against one
Mitchell and others for keeping a bad
house, and sued the Overseers of the
Poor for the statutory amount due him
for securing conviction. It appeared
that indictments were prepared against
Mitchell and others and they severally
pleaded guilty in October, 1842.
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"The judgment was respited that the
nuisances might in the meantime be
abated; and this having been done, the
parties were afterwards (in June, 1843)
brought up for judgment, when they
were each fined Is. and discharged."
(See page 484.)
Meanwhile the overseers were
changed, and the question was: Which
overseers were liable for the money?
Held, by Tindal, C. J., Coltman &
Cresswell, JJ., that the conviction was
not complete till judgment entered in
June, 1843, so that the later overseers
were held liable.
Until 14 Henry VI., c. 1, Justices of
Assize could only receive the verdict.
It was for the Court in Bane to give
sentence.
Chitty, Cr. Law (2d ed.), Vol. I., 696,
697.
At one time an ingenious device for
getting highways repaired seems to
have depended on a discretionary
power to suspend sentence, for after
verdict of acquittal, and before judgment thereon, they used to try the issue
again in another indictment.
Rex v. Wandsworth, 1 B. & Ald. 63.

eral approval suggested by Mr. Justice'
Lamar in United States v. Midwest Oil
Co., "236 U.S., at 472, when he said:
"Government is a practical affair intended for practical men. Both officers,
law makers, and citizens naturally
adjust themselves to any long continued
action.., on the presumption that unauthorized acts would not have been
allowed to be so oft6n repeated as to
crystallize into a regular practice," and
"this principle is recognized in every
jurisdiction." It illustrates in a very
striking way the actual discretionary
control of the application of mandatory
criminal punishments, which has always
been needed and exercised by the
prosecuting officers and the courts, no
matter how serious the crime or how
mandatory the language of the statute
imposing the punishment. The subject
has not been very frequently discussed
in the reports, but the law is clear.
Space will not permit extended discussion here. The leading historical
exposition of it is that of Lord Mansfield, in 1775, in Rex v. Rudd, 1 Cowper, 331, which forms the basis of the
The Old Law of "Approvement" and opinion of Judge Clifford in the "WhisIts Modern Development as Illustrating key Cases," 109 U. S., the leading
American case. These cases are disthe ProbationPrinciple
cussed at length in the earlier and more
Another illustration of the Common
extended edition of this paper in 1917
Law Principle from which probation
referred to at the outset.
practice developed is the practice in reIt is safe to say, therefore, that the
gard to prisoners who turn state's
modern
humane practice of probation
evidence.
The common law of "approvement" was developed in Massachusetts by
and its modern developments are not judges as a natural part of the business
the result of legislative authority-they of administering justice, in the same
are the results of the application of a manner that the rules of evidence deprinciple in practice and of executive veloped in the common law courts, and
acquiescence and of that force of gen- equitable remedies developed in the
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English Chancery Courts by the gradual application of principles demanded
by the interests of justice in a growing
community. And if the courts had not
shown this liberal spirit the legislative
recognition and provision for the necessary officers and funds to extend and
develop the probation system throughout the country would have been far
behind its present stage.
Probably one reason for the mass of
conflicting opinion in other jurisdictions
was the failure of the courts in Ohio
and elsewhere to recognize the logical
point in 1rocedure at which this discretionary power of the courts could be
properly exercised without statutory
authority. Instead of following the
Massachusetts practice of acting before
sentence these courts exhausted their
power by imposing sentence, and then
tried to suspend its execution, which
was beyond the judicial function until
extended by statute. This naturally
caused a confusion of ideas and authorities from which the shortest avenue of
escape was a decision-which made an
act of Congress necessary to secure uniform federal practice.
However that may be, the situation
calls for reflection. The late John C.
Gray, in his book on "The Nature and
Sources of the Law," has pointed out
that
"It is a matter of prime importance
to observe that . . . the development

of the law has been mainly due neither
to the legislature on the one hand nor
to the people on the other, but to learned
men, whether occupying or not judicial
positions."
The opinion in the Killits Case, of
course, explained the law only for the

Federal Courts-it did not affect the
common law powers of judges in those
states in which these powers had been
recognized, as in Massachusetts, for the
greater part of a century. The situation emphasizes, in an interesting way,
the fundamental importance of our dual
system of government, which provides
us with forty-eight state laboratories
of the common law of America. It also
suggests the importance of caution in
regard to recurrent epidemics of the
codification fever and tendencies to
overdo the work of uniform legislation,
particularly in the field of adjective
law. Law cannot develop to meet
all the needs of a community solely
through legislation, whether uniform or
not. Judicial advance by competent
judges within the field of judicial principles is absolutely essential to gradual
healthy improvement in the administration of justice. This is a fact which
must be recognized. The whole history
of the common law and of equity jurisdiction proves it. The ability to develop
law through the grasp of principles and
the translation of them into practical
application has been the distinguishing
mark of great judges.
The intellectual pioneer work of
judges in the field of justice usually
must precede (what may in time become desirable) legislative regulation
and extension, as for example, in this
matter of probation. In this country
this judicial pioneer work must be
mainly done by judges in the state
courts with the constantly increasing
assistance of the jurists whom our law
schools are developing.
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The broad perspective was expressed
by Mr. Justice Matthews in Hurtado
v. California, 110 U.S., at 531, as
follows:
"As it was the characteristic principle
of the common law to draw its inspiration from every fountain of justice, we
are not to assume that the sources of its
supply have been exhausted. On the
contrary, we should expect that the new
and various experiences of our own situation and system will mould and shape
it into new and not less useful forms."
The Punitive Theory of Justice.

has shown that the filling up of jails indiscriminately under this arbitrary test
is not now a protection to society, but
has become a positive menace by making many prisons mere schools of crime.
Accordingly the basis of the probation
system is, not "to relieve from punishment because of alleged virtues," but
in those cases where an examination of
the facts of the case warrant sufficient
hope for improvement, to deal with the
individual in such a way as to make
the best of that hope, on the ground
that he is more likely to be a future
menace to society if he is punished than
if he is given an opportunity under
supervision to improve without being
released from the jurisdiction of the
Court and the possibility of punishment
if the probation experiment does not
succeed.

It has been said that the power to
require security for good behavior was
a punitive measure mainly for the purpose of keeping peace because, of continued dangerous impulses of the convicted person, while the probation practice "relieves of punishment .. because of the alleged virtues of the defendant." A similar arbitrary explanaIt is always easy, and sometimes
tion might plausibly be made of all the fair, to ridicule certain phases of the
other expedients of harsher genera- practical application of principles by
tions discussed in this article. But the the courts. In the earlier periods of
idea that the common law principle of the growth of equity jurisdiction it was
administration of criminal justice was common to ridicule it by saying that it
exclusively a punitive principle does varied with the length of the chancelnot seem tenable in view of the evi- lor's foot. In the same way this or that
dence to the contrary. Nor is the idea variety of practice or occasional applithat probation is based upon "the al- cation -of the probation principle may
leged virtues" of the defendant tenable deserve ridicule and get it. It is not
either. The real basis and justification the intention in this article to minimize
of probation as a judicial question is in any way the serious consequences
that in many ways the common, abso- which may result if the temptation to
lute, punitive notion that justice can be be excessively benevolent or goodsuccessfully administered in advance natured or even to consider political
by wholesale, by the mandatory im- circumstances is yielded to.
position of arbitrary penalties to be apProbation as a judicial function is not
plied without discrimination in every a "capricious" or "arbitrary" jurisdiccase falling within a certain defined tion and the fact that it may be adclass, has broken down, and experience ministered occasionally by a judge who
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may have "capricious" or "arbitrary,"
or excesively benevolent pecularities
does not alter the essential nature of
the jurisdiction as one that is based
upon equitable principles which will
grow more distinct as time goes on.

the nature of the judicial power demanded by the changing conditions of
life in a great republic. As Mr. Justice
Holmes has said: "Law, being a practical thing, must found itself on actual
forces."

The Scope of the Opinion
in the Killits Case

We are not concerned with varying
definitions of the word "jurisdiction."
The three great divisions marked by
Articles I., II., and III. of the Federal
Constitution are "legislative powers,"
"the executive power," and "the judicial power." The word "jurisdiction"
occurs in a different sense in later parts
of Artcile III. It has no bearing upon
the nature of the judicial power
involved.
The fundamental purpose of the existence, as well as of the exercise, of
"judicial power" is the administration
of justice "by judges as free, impartial
and independent as the lot of humanity
will admit."
(Mass. Const., Art.
XXIX.)

Did the opinion of Chief Justice
White in the Killits case mean that the
Supreme Court of the United States
intended to suggest a line between the
fields of civil and criminal administrative law, so far as the legal possibilities
of judicial, as distinguished from legislative development, of principles are
concerned? It is difficult to believe this.
It seems that the opinion should be
accepted rather as a- mistaken but
practical short cut out of an unfortunate confusion of authorities and that
it should not be 'treated as having
broader application.*
This may be worth demonstrating
more fully by an examination of the
extent of the judicial power of the Federal Courts in connection with any
future rules of criminal procedure already referred to.
The "JudicialPower" of the
Federal Courts
A study of the nature of the "judicial
power" provided for in the third article
of the Federal Constitution and conferred by Acts of Congress, upon "the
inferior federal courts established by
Congress" must begin, not with law
dictionaries or a mass of inconsistent
authorities, but with a consideration of
* Cf. 24 American Judicature Society Journal
at pp. 155-6 (Feb. 1941).

This carefully expressed distinction
between the words "judicial power"
and "jurisdiction" is not only obvious,
but was expressly pointed out by the
Court in Kendall v. U. S. 12 Pet.
The distinction was respected in the
judiciary act and in the new Judicial
Code, which in Section 24 provides
that"The district Courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows: . . .
Second, Of all crimes and offenses
cognizable under the authority of the
United States."
This language is substantially taken
directly from the old judiciary act as to
the district and circuit courts (see R.S.,
Sections 563, 1st, and 629, 20th). It has
been in force for more than a century
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oath provided for judges in the same
Act, i.e., "to administer justice."
This administrative feature of the
judicial system was largely ignored in
various directions in recent years as
the result of a mechanical atmosphere
in the profession, which Dean Pound
and others have done so much to remove by the movement "for the adjustment of principles and doctrines to
the human conditions they are to
govern, rather than to assumed first
There was no accident about this use principles; for putting the human facof words. Some of our forefathers were tor in the central place and relegating
more careful and more sparing in the logic to its true position as an instruuse of words than modern legislative ment." (8 "Columbia Law Review," at
draftsmen, who consider it necessary pages 609 and 610.)
The three words, "to administer justo use seventeen words when one or
tice,"
when properly understood seem
two would suffice.
to include all the essential principles of
Accordingly, the Constitution and
the common law through which practhe code construed together give the
tice may be adapted to the changing
district courts all the "judicial power"
conditions of modern life. There is
needed to perform completely the juroom in those three words for all the
dicial function in the exercise of the
"original jurisdiction . . . of all crimes imagination that the profession can put
into them, and if the common law is
and offenses cognizable," etc. There are studied sympathetically in the light of
no legislative limitations imposed. The the human conditions
out of which it
judicial function should surely be con- grew, we may hope to hear more
apstrued in its broadest sense to meet preciative words spoken of its esential
the demands of criminal administration principles by some of our modern
in a great nation. And the funda- philosophers, who wish to reduce it all
mental purpose, in the light of which to the dead level of statutory
this transfer of power is to be liberally mediocrity. (See note in this number
construed, is specified in the statutory at p. 92 f.-Ed.)

and it is very significant that there is
no reference whatever to the words
"judicial power" in these statutory
grants of "jurisdiction." Why is this?
Is it not because all the necessary
"power" needed to exercise any specified jurisdiction was already expressly
provided by the Constitution, and all
that was needed was that Congress
should give it direction by the brief
sentences above quoted without unnecessary repetition?

